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OPERATIVE OFFERS IN CIRCULAR LETTERS
The recent holding of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Jenkins Towel
Service, Inc. v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co.' is particularly illustrative of
the need for careful and precise draftsmanship in the composition of circular
letters and other customary proposals employed by businessmen in their
solicitations. Often, in an attempt to make their propositions attractive, they
inadvertently subject themselves to contractual liability as did the drafters
in the instant case.
Here, defendants, acting within their capacity as fiduciaries, mailed
letters to several prospective purchasers of trust realty. Plaintiffs were the
recipients of one such letter. Among other things, the letter stipulated that
offers or bids must be in excess of 92,000 dollars, a check in the amount of 10
percent of the bid must be forwarded, offers would be on an all cash basis, an
agreement of sale would be tendered to the "highest acceptable bidder," and
all offers were subject to the approval of the trustees. In addition, the right
to withdraw the properties from the market was retained.2
This letter produced two responses, one from plaintiff and one from
the Esso Standard Oil Company. Both bids were in the same amount;
however, plaintiff's was in precise compliance with the provisions contained
in Fidelity's letter while Esso's bid was conditional. This action was com-
menced to prevent defendant's acceptance of Esso's offer and to obtain
specific performance of an alleged contract to sell the realty in question to
plaintiff.
The case reached the supreme court on appeal by the plaintiff from an
adverse ruling in the court of common pleas. By a majority decision the
court reversed the holding of the lower court, basing its decision upon a
finding that Fidelity's letter constituted not preliminary negotiations, but an
operative offer which created a power of acceptance in the highest bidder
complying with the instructions contained therein. Since plaintiff's bid had
been unconditional and in compliance with the letter, it was held to be a valid
acceptance of Fidelity's offer.
The single controlling issue to be determined in the Jenkins case was
whether the circular letter constituted an offer or mere preliminary negotia-
tions. In light of prior holdings it is difficult to rationalize the holding in
1. 161 A.2d 334 (Pa. 1960).
2. 161 A.2d at 335.
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this case. A review of established legal principles will illustrate this conclu-
sion.
The difference in effect between offers and preliminary negotiations is
elementary.3 An offer creates a power of acceptance which, upon execution,
gives rise to present contractual relations. Preliminary negotiations, on the
other hand, carry with them no such power of acceptance from which con-
tractual obligations may arise. However, the line of demarcation between
offers and preliminary negotiations is not amenable to precise delineation;
courts have established certain criteria to guide them in their decisions. An
examination of these criteria must be made in order that the holding in the
Jenkins case may be fairly examined.
It is a well settled principle of law in Pennsylvania that the court must,
when construing a communication, ascertain the intention of the party who
has made the alleged offer.4 This fact gives rise to the operation of various
rules of contract interpretation. In that the "objective theory" of contract
interpretation prevails today, these rules must be employed so as to determine
the actual manifested intent of the party. Since there must exist at the time
of the offer a present contractual intent, the primary consideration must be
whether or not the words used by the purported offeror were conditioned in
any way, express or implied, so as to preclude the finding of the requisite
manifestation of present contractual intent.5 The Restatement of Contracts
provides that:
If from a promise, or manifestation of intention, or from the cir-
cumstances existing at the time, the person to whom the promise or
manifestation is addressed knows or has reason to know that the
person making it does not intend it as an expression of his fixed
purpose until he has given a further expression of assent, he has
not made an offer.0
An express reservation of the right to reject any bids was held to be
controlling in one Pennsylvania case and was conclusive in another. In Straw
v. Williamsport,7 the city, in advertising for bids, included in the advertise-
ment the provision that the "council ...reserves the right to reject any or
3. See generally Upsal Street Realty Co. v. Rubin, 326 Pa. 327, 192 Atl. 481
(1937) ; Cohen v. Johnson, 91 F. Supp. 231 (M.D. Pa. 1950) ; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 25 (3d ed. 1957) ; 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 25 (1950) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 25
(1932) ; Vitro Mfg. Co. v. Standard Chemical Co., 291 Pa. 85, 139 Atl. 615 (1927);
Edgcomb v. Clough, 275 Pa. 90, 118 Atd. 610 (1922) ; Berkowitz v. Kass, 351 Pa. 263,
40 A.2d 691 (1945).
4. Windsor Mfg. Co. v. Makransky, 322 Pa. 466, 186 Atl. 84 (1936); Cohen v.
Johnson, 91 F. Supp. 231 (M.D. Pa. 1950).
5. Fogel Refrigerator Co. v. Oteri, 391 Pa. 88, 137 A.2d 255 (1957) aff'd, mem.,
10 Pa. D. & C.2d 511.
6. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 25 (1932).
7. 286 Pa. 41, 132 Atl. 804 (1926).
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all bids or any part of any bid."8 In holding that the advertisement did not
create a power of acceptance, the supreme court said: "The advertisement
reserved the right to reject any or all bids or parts of bids, and that is con-
clusive of the question." 9  (Emphasis added.) A similar situation existed
in the case of Hilliard Estate.'0 Here a corporate fiduciary mailed advertise-
ments to several prospective purchasers stating an asking price and stipulat-
ing that all offers were to be held subject to the approval of the co-executors.
Again the court held there had been no offer:
The circular letter, however, unequivocally stipulated that all
offers were subject to the approval of the co-executors, and that no
broker would be recognized unless offers submitted were acceptable
to the co-executors and a satisfactory agreement of sale executed.
Therefore, the circular letter merely constituted an invitation to
bid."
On the basis of the foregoing decisions it would be safe to say that one
important measure employed by the courts in determining whether a given
communication is an offer or preliminary negotiations is the presence or
absence of express reservations in the document in dispute.
In the absence of any express reservations or limitations, the problem
remains whether or not there may be implied reservations which would
militate against the finding of present contractual intent. This is the
area which presents the greatest difficulty. Some of the circumstances that the
courts will consider are the actual words used by the parties, general business
practices, the monetary amount involved, and the capacity in which the
parties are negotiating. These various factors merit further consideration as
they were all present under the facts in the Jenkins case.
In ascertaining the actual intent of the alleged offeror as manifested to
the alleged offeree, the words chosen should be examined with care since
the law will not presume that words are chosen carelessly.' 2 It must be
assumed that businessmen, by virtue of daily encounters with the law of
contracts, are aware of the difference between the making of an offer and
the asking for a bid. The dissent in the Jenkins case is consistent with this
proposition.
13
Not only must the choice of words be examined, but these words must
be given their ordinary meaning.14 If this maxim be applied when interpret-
8. Id. at 42, 132 Atl. at 805.
9. Id. at 43, 132 Atl. at 805.
10. 383 Pa. 63, 117 A.2d 728 (1955).
11. Id. at 66, 117 A.2d at 730.
12. See, e.g., Daniels v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 391 Pa. 195, 137 A.2d 304 (1958).
13. 161 A.2d at 339.




ing an alleged offer, it can readily be seen that the choice of words may be
instrumental in discovering the existence or non-existence of any implied
reservations.
If, however, it is impossible to determine the intention of its author
from the face of the writing, the court must look to other surrounding cir-
cumstances in its endeavor to ascertain the true import of the language used.
"The determination of whether a certain communication by one party to
another is an operative offer, and not merely an inoperative step in the pre-
liminary negotiations, is a matter of interpretation in light of all the sur-
rounding circumstances." ' , It is in this connection that the other circumstances
mentioned above become significant.
General business practices may aid the court in its search for the existence
of the requisite intent. The question here is whether businessmen in similar
circumstances would or would not make an offer. A recent case in the United
States District Court dealt with an alleged offer for the sale of coal over a
relatively long duration. 6 In dealing with the problem the court decided that
no offer had been proposed, stressing the fact that contracts for such a dura-
tion were uncommon in that particular industry.
Another circumstance that has been considered under the general head-
ing of business practices is the place at which the alleged offer was made.
In Brown v. Finney17 plaintiff contended that defendant had made an offer for
the sale and delivery of a substantial quantity of coal. The alleged offer was
made in a saloon where the two men had accidentally met. Acknowledging
the fact that it is extremely difficult to determine whether or not an offer
has been made, the court intimated the unlikelihood that a business trans-
action of such magnitude would be consummated under such circumstances.
The Brown case may also be taken to stand for the proposition that the
amount of money involved in the transaction may shed some light on the
party's actual intent. Although the court did not expressly set forth this
postulate in so many words, it is reasonable to assume that the amount in-
volved was one of the circumstances upon which the decision was founded.
As a rule of thumb, it would be fair to say that as the amount involved
increases, the possibility that an offer was made by circular letter decreases.
The capacity in which the alleged offeror is acting may be of aid in mak-
ing the correct decision in a given case. It is a familiar principle of the law of
trusts that a fiduciary is under a duty to exercise a high degree of care in
relation to his dealings with trust property.' 8 Where the purported offer stems
from one acting in such a capacity, it is justifiable to presume that he intends
15. CORBIN, CONTRAcrs § 22 (1950).
16. Cohen v. Johnson, 91 F. Supp. 231 (M.D. Pa. 1950).
17. 53 Pa. 373 (1866).
18. Herbert Estate, 356 Pa. 107, 51 A.2d 753 (1947).
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to fulfill his legal obligation of care and has reserved for himself any and
all safeguards possible. One such safeguard would be the right to reject any
bids submitted to him pursuant to an advertising circular.
In the case of Laskie v. Haseltine,'9 plaintiff was attempting to establish
acceptance of his bid by defendant. Plaintiff was the lowest bidder, and upon
the opening of the bids the defendant had said, "you are the lucky man." In
holding that there had been no acceptance, the court said:
After the bids had been opened, it was the right of the de-
fendant to inquire into the fitness and ability of the respective bidders
to fulfill the contract. He was not bound to award it to a bidder who
lacked either the skill, experience, or ability to properly perform
the contract.
2 0
This case stands to illustrate the point that courts have recognized by im-
plication the right of businessmen to inquire into the capacity and capabilities
of parties with whom they may become contractually involved. Where the
relationship involves the sale by a trustee of trust property, general trust
practice would demand such care. This care would only be possible through
the retention of the ultimate right of approval or disapproval of one with
whom business was to be conducted. If these factors are applied to cases
involving the construction of an alleged offer, it would indicate that if the
purported offeror is acting in a fiduciary capacity, it is doubtful that he
meant to bind himself to an unkown or unascertained offeree.
Still another measure of the purpose of a writing, one which may be of
aid to the court, is the definiteness and completeness of the alleged offer.
The question here is whether or not all of the important terms are set forth
in the writing. This consideration arises most frequently in cases involving
alleged offers to make leases. 21 In Upsal Street Realty Co. v. Rubin,22 the
court was called upon once again to determine if an offer had or had not been
made. The alleged offer was a writing which contained no mention of the
method of payment of the rent, whether it was to be paid by month, week or
year. It was held that no offer had been manifested due to the fact that
terms that would ordinarily appear in an offer of this nature were absent.
In addition to the specific language employed and the various factors to be
taken into consideration under the surrounding circumstances, the rules used
in construing written instruments may be of assistance to the court. Two
such rules have previously been mentioned. 23 In addition to those, there is
19. 155 Pa. 98, 25 Atl. 886 (1893).
20. Id. at 100, 25 Atl. at 888.
21. See generally Upsal Street Realty Co. v. Rubin, 326 Pa. 327, 192 Atl. 481
(1937) ; Way v. Fraser, 230 Pa. 49, 79 Atl. 154 (1911).
22. 326 Pa. 327, 192 Atl. 481 (1937).




the rule that an ambiguous writing is to be construed against its author.24
In addition it should be construed so as to give effect to all of its parts2 5
without directly violating any provisions clearly expressed therein.
26
The various circumstances, standards, and rules of interpretation set
forth above have been used time and again by Pennsylvania courts in ex-
amining communications for the purpose of extracting therefrom the author's
manifested intention. An application of these criteria to the specific fact
situation that presented itself in the Jenkins case seems to indicate that
the holding is not in concert with the proper utilization of these established
criteria.
It has been shown that in at least one and possibly two cases the reserva-
tions of the right to reject any ot' all parts of bids was held to be conclusive of
the determination between offer and preliminary negotiations. 27 An express
reservation also played a significant part in the Hilliard Estate case. 28 The
reservation made by Fidelity was as strong or stronger than those employed
by the draftsmen of the aforementioned cases and yet very little weight was
afforded it by the court. Upon the basis of the Jenkins holding, it would
appear that any reservation of the right to approve or disapprove, however
clearly stated, is no longer controlling or conclusive.
The concept of giving words their natural construction has been men-
tioned. Does not the use of the word "offer" and the word "bid" by an
experienced business concern, given a natural construction and considered
with the presumption that words are not chosen carelessly, lead one to
believe that no present contractual intent was manifested? In what manner
could the defendants in the Jenkins case have expressed themselves so as to
forestall the conclusion that they were proposing an offer rather than merely
soliciting bids? The majority in the Jenkins case gave no weight to the use
of the terms "offer" and "bid."
That contracts are to be reasonably construed has been mentioned among
the rules of interpretation. It must be remembered that Fidelity reserved
in itself the right to approve or disapprove any and all offers and yet even
this unequivocal provision was rendered ineffectual by the majority's inter-
pretation. In reference thereto the court stated:
We believe the sentence means that Fidelity can withdraw the
24. See, e.g., Mowry v. McWherter, 365 Pa. 232, 74 A.2d 154 (1950); Acchione
v. City of Philadelphia, 394 Pa. 622, 149 A.2d 125 (1959).
25. See, e.g., Neal D. Ivey Co. v. Franklin Associates, 370 Pa. 225, 87 A.2d 236
(1952) ; Appeal of Powell, 385 Pa. 467, 123 A.2d 650 (1956) ; Cerco v. DeMarco, 391
Pa. 157, 137 A.2d 296 (1958).
26. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Nelson-Pedley Const. Co., 303 Pa. 174, 154 Atl.
383 (1931).
27. Straw v. Williamsport, supra note 7; Hilliard Estate, supra note 10.
28. 383 Pa. 63, 117 A.2d 728 (1955).
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properties from the market at any time before the opening of the
sealed bids, and can approve or disapprove any offer which does not
comply with all the conditions set forth by the Fidelity, or which
complies but adds unsatisfactory terms.
29
As to the right to disapprove or approve of any offers which do not comply
with conditions set forth in the letter, this would be mere surplusage as
Fidelity had already stated it would not even consider those offers not
complying with the basic conditions.30 In addition, Fidelity needed no
''protection" against an acceptance coupled with unsatisfactory terms since
such an acceptance would constitute a rejection of the offer and a counter-
offer.
Moreover, the court ignored the rule of construction that provides that a
contract should be construed so as not to directly violate something clearly
expressed therein. All offers means each and every one, not only certain ones.
This important word was, in effect, stricken from Fidelity's letter. Its im-
portance was further exhibited by the addition of the clause reserving the
right to withdraw the properties from the market. This would seem to elimi-
nate any possibility that the purpose of "all" was to retain such right. The
remaining alternative of the meaning of "all" was to amplify the word "any"
so as to permit rejection of all offers not merely certain ones.
The holding in the Jenkins case does not, it is true, enunciate any new or
revolutionary principles of contract law. However, it is significant by virtue
of its omissions. The court did not avail itself of a number of important
criteria mentioned above in arriving at its decision, choosing instead to eluci-
date on the rule that an ambiguous writing must be interpreted most strongly
against its author.
It is fundamental that the law of contracts has, as one of its primary
purposes, the task of imparting a degree of certainty into the everyday
business transaction. Each individual decision by the courts has a dual
function in keeping with this purpose. The first is to resolve the conflict
between the parties before the tribunal; the second, and, it is submitted, more
important, is to establish a guidepost for the use of lawyers in advising their
clients.
What is the nature of the advice to be given in light of the holding in the
Jenkins case? In soliciting bids for a particular piece of property there are
two important considerations in the mind of the vendor. He desires to sell
the property and, secondly, he desires to obtain the maximum number of bids
possible in order to increase the price he will receive by virtue of competi-
tive bidding. The letter of communication soliciting the bids must be such
29. 161 A.2d at 338.
30. 161 A.2d at 336.
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as will provoke the most response and yet retain for its proponent some
degree of control over the final award of the contract. This final goal can
only be obtained by insuring that the letter will not be construed as an
operative offer.
One thing is certain, there should never be contained in the given
communication a naked statement to the effect that any of the bids will be
accepted. This mistake was made by Fidelity when it stated that an agree-
ment of sale would be awarded the highest acceptable bidder. A statement that
the contract would be awarded to the bidder most acceptable to Fidelity re-
gardless of the amount of the bid would possibly have resulted in a decision
in Fidelity's favor. All statements pertaining to the award of the contract
should be drafted so as to preclude the representation that any one bidder
will prevail, either because of amount or any other thing.
Where the party soliciting the offer wishes to retain the right to reject
any or all offers or to withdraw the property from the market at any time,
he should say so unequivocally at both the beginning and at the end of the
communication. He should also expressly state that this right to reject any
or all bids or to withdraw the property from the market may be done before
or after the submission of the bids and before or after the opening of the bids
if they are sealed. The phrase "at any time" should not be used to convey
this intention.
A final safeguard might be to include in the letter a statement to the
effect that it is not to be construed nor is it intended to constitute an operative
offer. This could be followed by specific mention of its intended character
as preliminary negotiations.
In conclusion, the Jenkins case is a strong caveat that businessmen who
draft letters seeking bids must take the utmost care so as to avoid ambiguities
possibly resulting in unexpected contractual obligations.
ROBERT L. SCHUMANN
THE HIGHLAND CASE: AN EXTENSION OF THE
DUNHAM RULE TO GRANTS
The Dunham Rule is a rule of construction applied where there is an
exception or reservation of minerals in a deed. Under this rule, a rebuttable
presumption arises that oil and natural gas are not retained by the grantor
by virtue of an exception or reservation unless specifically enumerated.' A
recent Pennsylvania case, Highland v. Commonwealth,2 has extended the
Dunham Rule to grants, as well as to exceptions and reservations.
The rule arose in Dunham v. Kirkpatrick,3 when the court was faced
with the question of whether or not the following language was sufficient
to reserve petroleum oil to the grantor: "Excepting and reserving all the
timber suitable for sawing; also, all minerals; also the the right of way to
take off such timber and minerals."'4 In answering in the negative, the court
appears to have based its reasoning on the premise that to include petroleum
oil within the term "minerals" would make the reservation all-inclusive, i.e.,
a mineral would include any and all inorganic substances such as rock, sand,
and clay, thus rendering the deed void for repugnancy in that the reserva-
tion would be as extensive as the grant.5 Otherwise, an extensive grant
would be limited to surface rights, a result which seems unintended consider-
ing the language used. The court further states that in a deed nothing which
is not of a metallic nature should be included in the term minerals unless the
parties manifest their intentions to the contrary. This stems from the rule
that words are to be given their ordinary meaning; and, the court found that
oil is not considered to be a mineral in the popular, as distinguished from the
scientific, meaning of the word.6
In a subsequent case, the principles embraced by the rule were laid out
more precisely. 7 Here, the court conceded that there are some instances
where natural gas and oil have been considered to be minerals. It emphasized,
"The crucial question . . . is what was the sense in which the parties used
the word? .... It may in any particular case have a different meaning, more
extensive or more restrictive, but such different meaning should clearly appear
as intended by the parties."8 Even with this clarification, the soundness of the
rule seems to have been questioned.
In Preston v. South Penn Oil Co.," the court appeared reluctant to follow
1. Dunham and Shortt v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36 (1882).
2. 400 Pa. 261, 161 A.2d 390 (1960).
3. 101 Pa. 36 (1882).
4. Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, supra note 1, at 37.
5. Id. at 43.
6. Id. at 44.
7. Silver v. Bush, 213 Pa. 195, 62 Atl. 823 (1906).
8. Id. at 197, 62 Atl. at 833.
9. 238 Pa. 301, 86 Atl. 203 (1913).
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the Dunham Rule but rationalized its decision by explaining that "Dunham
v. Kirkpatrick has been the law of this state for 30 years and very many titles
to land rest upon it. It has been a rule of property and will not be dis-
turbed."' 0 Thus, it appears that the court was constrained to follow the rule
due to the bases of stare decisis and public policy.
Approximately forty years later, in the case of Bundy v. Myers," the
court held that a reservation of oil did not include the reservation of gas.'
2
The language in the deed consisted of the following: "Excepting and reserv-
ing, out of this land, the oil, coal, fire clay and minerals of every kind and
character . . . . ,u3 The opinion concludes that since oil is not a mineral and
must be specifically reserved, natural gas must likewise be specifically re-
served. 14 This is the conclusion despite the fact that oil and gas are popularly
understood as belonging to the same general inorganic classification. Hence,
the court applied this rule so that any specification of nonmetallic mineral
was deemed to evidence an intent to exclude other nonmetallic minerals.
The previously mentioned cases to which the Dunham Rule was applied
dealt only with the problem of exceptions and reservations and appear to
be directly in line with the case in which the rule was originally formulated.
However, the Highland case is one of first impression in that it was the ini-
tial application of the rule to grants. The latter case involved a controversy
over the rights to the natural gas deposits in and under four parcels of land.
On June 25, 1900, I. F. Richey and others, trustees of the Caledonia Coal
Company, conveyed to one N. T. Arnold the four parcels of land situated in
Pennsylvania. At the end of the descriptive portion of this deed, appeared
the following: "It is the intention of (Richey et al.) to convey . . . all the
land, coal, coal oil, fire clay, natural gas and other minerals . . . ."1 By this
deed, it was conceded that title to the natural gas rights in the four parcels
of land became vested in Arnold.
On the same date as that of the previously mentioned deed, Arnold,
grantee in the above-mentioned deed, conveyed two of the parcels to one
John Byrne. The latter was to receive: "All the coal, fire clay, limestone,
iron-ore and other minerals in and under certain land . . . with the right and
privilege of entering upon said land and taking away said coal, fire clay, iron-
ore, limestone and other minerals hereby conveyed .... ."6 The two remain-
ing parcels involved were conveyed by Arnold to one Hall and one Kaul on
July 30, 1900. The essential provisions contained in this deed were that there
10. Id. at 304, 86 Atl. at 204.
11. 372 Pa. 583, 94 A.2d 724 (1953).
12. Id. at 588, 94 A.2d at 726.
13. Id. at 584, 94 A.2d at 725.
14. Id. at 587, 94 A.2d at 726.
15. Highland v. Commonwealth, 400 Pa. 261, 265, 161 A.2d 390, 393 (1960).
16. Id. at 266, 161 A.2d at 393.
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was to be a conveyance of " 'all the coal, iron-ore, limestone, fire clay and
other minerals' under a certain tract of land. 'All the Coal, Coal Oil, and other
minerals of every kind and character' under another tract of land. .. -17 After
the descriptive clauses in this deed, the following appeared: "Together with
right and privilege of entering upon said lands and taking away said coal,
coal oil, fireclay and other minerals of every kind and character."'8 All the
right, title, and interest conveyed in the Byrne and Hall-Kaul deeds by
subsequent conveyances became vested in a group known as New Shawmut
Mining Company which asserted title to the natural gas rights in the four
parcels of land in the instant case.
The New Shawmut Company argued that the grantors in the Richey
deed proceeded on the basis that natural gas was a mineral. Since the Byrne
deed was executed on the same date as the Richey deed and the Hall-Kaul
deed was executed only one month later, it should be presumed that the latter
two deeds were executed on the exact same basis, i.e., natural gas should be
included within the term "minerals."' 1 On the other hand, Arnold's rep-
resentatives contended that the exclusion of "natural gas" from the detailed
enumeration of minerals in the Byrne and Hall-Kaul deeds and its inclusion
in the Richey deed indicate that the parties intended to exclude natural gas
from the word "minerals" in the former deeds.2 0 Additional contentions of
the Arnold group were that the "rights-of-way" necessary for extracting
natural gas were not conveyed in the Byrne and Hall-Kaul deeds. Further,
by applying the rule of ejusdem generis, the only minerals that were conveyed
by implication were hard minerals of the same type and character as those
specifically enumerated.
2 1
However, the court based its decision on the Dunham Rule, i.e., the pre-
sumption that natural gas is not a mineral unless specifically enumerated.
The court found that the presumption had not been rebutted. It also stated
as a reason for the decision that the acquisition of natural gas rights was not
the "principle objective" of the Byrne and Hall-Kaul deeds. The fact, that
twenty-five years subsequent to the execution of these two deeds the land still
had not been explored for natural gas deposits by the New Shawmut group
or their predecessors in title, tends to substantiate this latter theory.
Another factor employed in arriving at the decision was the language
used in the Richey deed and the Byrne and Hall-Kaul deeds. The court met
the above-mentioned contention of the Shawmut group that the intention of
the above deeds to convey gas was the same by stating:
17. Id. at 267, 161 A.2d at 394.
18. Id. at 267, 161 A.2d at 394.
19. Id. at 277, 161 A.2d at 399.
20. Id. at 278, 161 A.2d at 399.
21. Id. at 278, 161 A.2d at 399.
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Four minerals--coal, fire clay, limestone, and iron-ore-are
specifically mentioned in the Byrne deed; two minerals-coal and
coal oil-are specifically mentioned in the Hall-Kaul deed; a study
of the language in both deeds indicates a high degree of selectivity
and precision of language and description to have been employed
by Arnold, especially bearing in mind that he had but recently been
expressly given the rights to the natural gas. Arnold's omission of
natural gas, coupled with the variation in the delineation of the
minerals expressly conveyed to Byrne and Hall-Kaul indicate that
Arnold did not intend to convey all the mineral rights he had re-
ceived from Richey et al.
22
These factors, along with the application of the rule of ejusdem generis,
motivated the court to conclude that the Dunham Rule was controlling and
"that, [although] the word 'minerals' appears in a grant, rather than in an
exception or reservation, in nowise alters the rule."'23 (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the conclusion reached by the court is that the Byrne and Hall-Kaul
deeds did not convey title to the natural gas rights and the New Shawmut
group, successors in title to Byrne and Hall-Kaul, has no title to such rights.24
Query, whether the court was bound to apply the Dunham Rule. Pre-
viously, as has been mentioned, the rule was applied solely to exceptions and
reservations. The court in the Highland case, as in the Preston case, appears
just a bit reluctant to apply the rule. Again, the court stated: "As a rule of
property long recognized and relied upon, the Dunham Rule binds and con-
trols this situation .... -25 The majority in nowise recognizes any distinction
between an exception or reservation and a grant. In other words, the only
facet of the rule with which the court was concerned was that natural gas
should not be construed to be a mineral; it did not matter that the rule, as
originally adopted, applied only to reservations and exceptions. It is not
contended that the court should have made such a distinction; it is only
suggested that perhaps the court was not bound to follow the Dunham Rule
as one might gather from a reading of the opinion.
The court, in the Dunham case, concluded that to include natural gas
within the term "minerals" would be to include all inorganic substances within
the term, thus making the deed void for repugnancy in that it would be as
extensive as the grant.26 But where only a grant, rather than an exception
or reservation, is involved, as in the Highland case, would it necessarily fol-
low that to include natural gas within the term "minerals" would void the
deed ? Thus, it would appear that this may be a situation where the expres-
22. Id. at 279, 161 A.2d at 400.
23. Id. at 277, 161 A.2d at 399.
24. Id. at 280, 161 A.2d at 400.
25. Id. at 276, 161 A.2d at 398.
26. Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, supra note 3, at 43.
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sion, "When the reason for the rule fails, the rule also fails," might be
appropriately applied.
It is submitted that a rule of construction, such as the Dunham Rule, has
two basic purposes. One is that it governs the effect of an ascertained inten-
tion or points out what a court should do in the absence of express or implied
intention; the other is that it serves to augment a decision based extensively
on a desirable policy. There is no doubt that the court was seeking to
determine the intention of the parties in the Highland case but it is equally
evident that there was an underlying "desirable policy" which the court
sought to satisfy. Since the Dunham Rule now applies to exceptions, reserva-
tions, and grants, there is more uniformity in the construction and prepara-
tion of deeds involving a transfer of mineral rights. That such deeds involving
grants were heretofore drafted in accordance with the rule is at least
questionable in that no such cases were ever litigated. Rather, it would seem
that earlier deeds were drafted pursuant to the original scope of the Dunham
Rule, viz., reservations and exceptions.
A rule of construction usually applied to deeds involving ambiguities, and
one which the court might have applied in the Highland case, is the rule that
such ambiguities should be construed most strongly against the grantor.
2 7 If
this latter rule of construction had been applied in the Highland case, the
court could have reached a contrary result. Under this rule, the meaning of
the word "minerals" would have been construed most strongly against the
grantor, Arnold, and the court could have found that the natural gas rights
were conveyed by the grant.
Other jurisdictions seem to have a varied opinion on the validity of the
Dunham Rule. The Ohio Supreme Court, in line with Pennsylvania, has
stated that, where the grantor provided for the dispersement of ". . . all the
coal of every variety and all the iron ore, fire clay and other valuable minerals
.... ,,us there was nothing to show that oil was intended to pass, for if it had
been, apt words would have been used to show such intent.2 9 The Supreme
Court of Kentucky, in a case involving a lease or sale of "all mineral rights in
the land," made reference to the Pennsylvania and Ohio decisions, and was
of the opinion that the grantees did not gain title to the natural gas rights.80
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Tennessee takes issue with the
basic principles upon which the Dunham Rule exists by stating:
The great weight of authority is not only opposed to that case,
[Dunham case] but it seems to us to proceed upon false principles.
27. Klaer v. Ridgway, 86 Pa. 529, 534 (1878).
28. Detlor et al. v. Holland, 52 Ohio 492, 494, 49 N.E. 690, 691 (1898).
29. Id. at 504, 49 N.E. at 693.
30. McKinney's Heirs v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 134 Ky. 239, -,
120 S.W. 314, 317 (1909).
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The ground of the decision . . . is that by the bulk of mankind
nothing is considered as mineral except such things as be of metallic
nature .... We think, however, that the true meaning of the word
"mineral" as well as its meaning among the bulk of mankind, must
be determined from dictionaries and other similar authorities. We
do not think that the bulk of mankind could be regarded as holding
that the word "mineral" applied only to metals."'
A dictionary definition of the word "mineral" appears to, at least in part,
substantiate the court's opinion. It is defined as "any inorganic chemical
substance existing naturally. '32 "Inorganic chemical substance" would seem
to include natural gas and oil. This appears to have been adopted in an
early Michigan case when it was argued that, "the use of the words 'all
minerals' is not sufficient in a reservation to include petroleum oil, or gas,"
the court took the position that "as far as our examination goes this case
[Dunham v. Kirkpatrick] stands alone."
83
Another jurisdiction even goes further and takes the position that,
unless the term "minerals" is in some way qualified or restricted in the deed,
it is presumed that both natural gas and oil were intended to be included
within such term. 4 The reasoning is based upon the premise that, "Legally
and scientifically, oil and gas are universally held to be minerals. At the
present time they are popularly so considered." 35 Thus, a basic point of
departure by the courts is the criteria to be used to determine whether the
word "minerals" is, or is not, popularly understood to include or preclude
natural gas and oil. An examination of some Pennsylvania cases discloses
that the courts still hold that natural gas and oil are minerals for many
purposes.8 6 However, a West Virginia court has suggested why these deci-
sions are not necessarily inconsistent with those decisions espousing the
Dunham Rule:
[TIhese decisions do not necessarily conflict with that of
Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, for they declare that, in a legal sense, oil
and gas are minerals, while the other cases declare that, as tested by
the intention of the parties to a deed, disclosed by the terms used
therein, viewed in the light of the popular meaning of the term, a
mere matter of contract, they are not minerals. The determination
of the question by that standard seems to us inevitably to produce
a contrary result.
8 7
31. Murray v. Allard, 100 Tenn. 100, -, 43 S.W. 355, 359 (1897).
32. WEBSTER, NEW AMERICAN DICTIONARY (1955).
33. Weaver v. Richards, 156 Mich. 320, -,120 N.W. 818, 819 (1909).
34. Sult v. Hochstetter Oil Co., 63 W. Va. 317, -, 61 S.E. 307, 311 (1908).
35. Id. at -, 61 S.E. at 311.
36. Stoughton's Appeal, 88 Pa. 198 (1879) ; Funk v. Haldeman, 53 Pa. 229 (1867);
Gill v. Weston, 110 Pa. 312, 1 Atl. 921 (1885); Blakley v. Marshall, 174 Pa. 425, 34
Atl. 564 (1896); Marshall v. Mellon, 179 Pa. 371, 36 Atl. 201 (1897).
37. Sult v. Hochstetter Oil Co., 63 W. Va. 317, -, 61 S.E. 307, 311 (1908).
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Regardless of the soundness of the rule, Pennsylvania conveyancers will have
to take cognizance of it in situations where it may be applied. In conclusion,
it would seem in Pennsylvania, that whenever the attorney is confronted
with a conveyance involving the transfer or retention of natural gas and oil
along with other mineral rights, he should specifically enumerate in the deed
that gas and oil are elements to be either transferred or retained. Although
the surrounding circumstances may serve to indicate who has the right,
title, and interest in the gas and oil, a specific enumeration thereof tends to
remove any doubt. In addition, it would appear to be advisable for the at-
torney when conveying other than absolute title, such as a license or a
leasehold, to specifically enumerate the elements of natural gas and oil. This
would remove any ambiguities from an extension of the Dunham Rule to
any and all transfers of mineral rights in land.
BERNERD A. BUZGON
THE ABOLITION OF THE YEAR AND A DAY RULE:
COMMONWEALTH V. LADD
In the recent case of Commonwealth v. Ladd,' the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania sustained a murder indictment where death had occurred more
than a year and a day after the alleged fatal blow, and thus abolished the
common law "year and a day" rule. Prior to this decision, the rule had been
that if more than a year and a day intervened between the injury and the
death of the victim, the injury was not legally deemed the cause of death.
Consequently, the person who inflicted the injury would not be criminally
responsible for the homicide. 2
In banishing the rule, the court first determined that it was evidentiary
in nature, and then stated that "we may change a common law rule of
evidence without being guilty of judicial legislation, and abolish it when we
are aware that modern conditions have moved beyond it and left it sterile."
'3
Before analyzing this reasoning, attention must be drawn to the enactments
of the Pennsylvania General Assembly. The "year and a day" rule has not
been codified; also, murder has not been defined but merely divided into
degrees with penalty provisions added.4 The courts of this Commonwealth
have construed this absence of statutory definition to mean that the legis-
lature intended to give murder its common law meaning.5 If the "year and
a day" rule is considered an element of murder, any statement as to its status
must stem from the common law. Pennsylvania, of course, has its own
common law, but the legislature also specifically adopted the prior laws and
acts of Pennsylvania's pre-revolutionary provincial government and the
statutory and common law of England.6 As a result, the definition of
murder and the "year and a day" rule, as found within the realm of the
English common law, were adopted into Pennsylvania law.
In the Ladd case then, because of Pennsylvania's "common law" murder,
the court was squarely faced with the question of whether it could properly
abolish the "year and a day" rule without being guilty of judicial legislation.
The majority felt free to abolish the rule if it was not substantive or part of
the definition of murder.7 The determination of what does or does not con-
stitute an invasion of legislative power apparently flowed from Common-
wealth v. Redline where the court said: "The only constitutional power com-
1. Commonwealth v. Ladd, Nos. 165, 166, Sup. Ct. Pa., Dec. 1. 1960.
2. 40 C.J.S., Homicide § 12 (1944).
3. Commonwealth v. Ladd, supra note 1, majority opinion at 10.
4. 15 PA. STATS. 1794, ch. 1177 § 2; PA. STATS., 1860, Act. No. 374 § 74; PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (1939).
5. Commonwealth v. Exler, 243 Pa. 155, 89 At. 968 (1914); Commonwealth v.
Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 113 A.2d 464 (1955) ; White v. Commonwealth, 6 Binn. 179 (Pa.
1813). See also, 17 P.L.E., Homicide § 14 (1959) ; 40 C.J.S., Homicide § 13 (1944).
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 152 (1777).
7. Commonwealth v. Ladd, supra note 1, majority opinion at 4.
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petent to define crimes and prescribe punishments therefor is the legislature
and the courts do well to leave the promulgation of police regulations to the
people's chosen legislative representatives."" (Emphasis added.) Thus being
required to uncover the nature of the rule, resort to the common law was
necessary.
The first mention found of the year and a day term in the English
common law is in the Statute of Glouchester enacted in 1278. 9 This statute
allowed a year and a day from the time of the injury for a private appeal
of murder to be initiated.' Viewed in the light of the first statute, the rule
appears to be in the form of a statute of limitations because it dealt with the
period within which an action might be initiated. However, later commen-
tators used this statute as authority for holding it was a rule of evidence
since the period was to run from the date of the "stroke" rather than from
the time of death. Subsequently, there followed a period of confusion as to
whether the time was to run from the day of the blow or from the time of
death. This was probably due to the fact that the Statute of Glouchester
stated the time was to run from the blow. It should be kept in mind though,
that the purpose of the statute was to limit the time of bringing the appeal,
which more logically should seem to run from the date of death. The con-
fusion is pointed up by Heydon's Case," a murder trial heard during the
latter part of the sixteenth century in which the court ruled the time was to
run from the day of the death. This case has been held to be the principal
authority for concluding the "year and a day" rule is by nature a limitation.
As the rule developed, the controversy revolved between viewing the
year and a day rule as substantive or evidentiary; the procedural view hav-
ing been almost completely discarded. This difference of opinion has con-
tinued to the present day in the case law and among the various authorities
-the sides being almost equally divided.1
2
8. 391 Pa. 486, 490, 137 A.2d 472, 473 (1959).
9. Statute of Glouchester, 1278, 6 Edw. 1, c. 9, This statute provided:
An Appeal for Murther
The King Commandeth that no Write fhall be granted out of the Chancery for the
death of a Man to enquire whether a Man did kill another by Misfortune, or in his own
Defence, or in other Manner without Felony; (2) be he fhall be put in Prison until
the coming of the Justices in Eyre, or Juftices affigned to the Goal-delivery, and fhall
put himself upon the Evil; (3) In cafe it be found by the Country, that he did it in
his Defence, or by Misfortune then by the Report of the Juftices to the King, the King
fhall take him to his Grace, if it pleafe him. (4) It is provided alfo, that no Appeal
fhall be abated to foon as they have been heretofore; but if the Appellor declare the
Deed was done and with that Weapon he was fain, the Appeal shall ftand in effect.
(5) and fhall not be abated for Default or frefh Suit, if the Party fhall fue within the
Year and the Day after the Deed done.
10. See Commonwealth v. Ladd, supra note 1, majority opinion at 2 for an ex-
planation of early common law murder appeals.
11. 4 Coke's Reports 41, 76 Eng. Rep. 631 (1558).
12. See Commonwealth v. Ladd, supra note 1. In addition, see People v. Murphy,
39 Cal. 52 (1870) ; State v. Sides, 64 Mo. 383 (1877) ; The People v. Wallace, 9 Cal.
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The majority in the present case stated that the rule was a rule of
evidence without setting forth reasons for such a conclusion. Regardless of
the exact nature of the rule, it was undoubtedly a cogent factor in the prose-
cution of murder. It would seem to require, therefore, a precise and detailed
explanation when used as a basis for abolishing the rule.
The concurring justice stated: "From my examination of the authorities
I am convinced that the year and a day rule was, at common law, part and
parcel-and an absolutely essential indispensable part and parcel--of the
substantive law of murder."'13 Thus, the concurring opinion amplifies the
above mentioned conclusion as to the exact nature of the rule.
The justice then went on to concur in the majority's conclusion for the
reason that the "year and a day" rule, although found in the substantive law
of England, was never part of the common law of Pennsylvania. This being
so, he deduced that the court could then justifiably refuse to apply the rule
in the present case. Would it not seem though, that since the Act of 1777'"
specifically adopted the common law of England as the common law of Penn-
sylvania without excepting the "year and a day" rule from its coverage, that
the rule must have become part of the law of Pennsylvania?
The position assumed by the majority-that the rule may also be ex-
tinguished because it is excluded from the definition of murder-seems some-
what questionable, considering the judicial determination at hand. Initially,
it should be pointed out that an inherent problem exists in the formulation
of the definition of a common law crime. Is not a definition merely a crude
attempt to formulate the "highlights" of a particular cause of action? It
would seem to be by no means all inclusive. The problem of complete
definition is pointed up by Bishop, one of the most analytical of our writers
on the criminal law.15 In his work he first presents and criticizes the defini-
tion of murder formulated by Hawkins, and in a note, reproduces those
framed by Coke and Mansfield. Bishop then ventures upon one of his own
and concludes by saying that a definition of murder "in all respects neat,
complete, and exact is in the nature of the subject impossible."' e
Also intimated in the majority opinion was that no authority could be
uncovered where the year and a day rule was included within the definition
of murder. In this regard, Sir Edward Coke, writing in 1628, defined the
offense of murder as follows:
31 (1858) ; Commonwealth v. Parker, 2 Pick. 550 (Mass. 1824) ; State v. Mayfield,
66 Mo. 125 (1877); Rex v. Dyson, 2 K.B. 454, 171 Eng. Rep. 461 (1908); 2 BIsHop,
CRIMINAL LAW 483 (9th ed. 1923) ; HARRIS & WILSHERE, CRIMINAL LAW 187 (15th ed.
1933) ; Annot., 20 A.L.R. 1006 (1922) ; Annot., 93 A.L.R. 1470 (1934) ; 10 Wisc. L.
REv. 112 (1934) ; 15 TUL. L. REv. 306 (1940) ; 19 MINN. L. REv. 240 (1935).
13. Commonwealth v. Ladd, supra note 1, concurring opinion at 1.
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 152 (1777).
15. 2 BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW, §§ 732-735 (9th ed. 1923).
16. Id. at § 735.
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Murder is when a man of found memory, and of the age of dif-
cretion, unlawfully killeth within' any country of the realm any
reafonable creature in rerum natura under the King's peace, with
malace fore-thought, either expreffed by the party, or implied by
the law, fo as the party wounded, or hurt, &c. die of the wound or
hurt, &c. within a year and a day after the fame.17 [Emphasis
added.]
Hawkins, writing in 1716, included the rule within his definition of murder I8
as did Warren in essence.' 9
When a court is abolishing a rule of law, it is submitted that the proper
exercise of judicial power should be explained and supported by broad
policies concerning the criminal law rather than narrow determinations rest-
ing on very technical bases. The aim and purpose of the criminal law is to
provide adequate protection for society and simultaneously assure justice
for the individual accused. A balance between the two requires a deter-
mination which necessarily varies with the environment and background of
the particular individual making the inquiry. For this reason it seems that
alteration or modification of the criminal law (other than a mere procedural
rule) should be made by the legislature where a more representative deter-
mination may be made.
Justice Musmanno, commenting in a strong dissent, criticized the
majority's exercise of power. He considered the existence and application
of the rule so well established that abolition of the rule by the judiciary
necessitated invasion of the exclusive province of the legislature. Thus, the
basis of this argument was stare decisis. Such a rationale undoubtedly has
merit, especially in the light of one of the aims of the criminal law-certainty
and predictibility. However, the emphasis to be placed on such an argument
would seem to fade when opposed by the threat from a crime involving
serious moral turpitude.
Constitutional considerations also appeared in the court's path when
abolishing the rule. In this regard the pertinent provision of the Pennsylvania
constitution is article 1, section 9, titled "Rights of Accused in Criminal
Prosecutions" which provides: ". . . he cannot be compelled to give evidence
against himself, nor can he be deprived of his life, liberty or property, unless
by judgment of his peers or the law of the land." (Emphasis added.) The
"law of the land" has been construed to mean due process of law.2 0 This is a
somewhat nebulous term used to describe the constitutional guarantee of
basic fairness in acts by the sovereign in dealing with individual citizens.
17. COKE, 3 INST. 47 (1797).
18. 1 HAWKINS, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 78 (8th ed. 1824).
19. See 1 WARREN, HOMICIDE 185 (perm. ed. 1938) where the author includes the
"year and a day" rule within the definition of homicide.
20. Banning v. Taylor, 24 Pa. 289 (1955) ; Menges v. Dentler, 33 Pa. 495 (1859).
1961]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
The majority did not directly dispose of this question. However, they did
note at one point that "we are not dealing with any of the basic and living
rights of the defendant, like the right to confront his accuser, the right to be
presumed innocent, or the right to due process of law."
'2 1
The only query raised which might infringe on constitutional due process
would be the retroactive effect of abolition of the "year and a day" rule at
a time after the alleged assault was committed. However, banishment of
the rule does not deprive the defendant of any fundamental right. In theory
the court is construing the rule's application in the light of conditions and
circumstances which existed at the time of the injury and not when the
appeal is taken. In addition, it does not offend one's sense of justice that
abolition of the rule takes place after the commission of the crime since
murder involves serious moral turpitude and it is only a chance happening
that the victim lives longer than a year and a day after the assault. More-
over, it is not as if the burden is removed from the prosecution to prove that
death flowed from the wrongful act of the defendant. When viewed in this
light, there appears to be no constitutional violation involved.
In overruling the "year and a day" rule, the majority seemed impelled
by the fact that the rule's basis is presently anachronistic. The reason for
the "year and a day" rule was stated by Coke to be that, "If he died after
that time [year and a day] it cannot be discerned, as the law presumes
whether he died of the stroke or poison, etc., or a natural death; and in the
case of life, the law ought to be certain."'22 Thus, Coke's interpretation of
the reason for the rule appears to be that it was an arbitrary settlement of
what may have originally been a very difficult question of proof of physical
cause. The difficulty of proof arose because: First, in the early English
courts the jury found the verdict upon their own knowledge, or expressed
the community conviction on the question ;23 Secondly, medical technology
simply had not developed to the point where death could be determined to
have resulted from a particular cause.
However, today both of these reasons for the difficulty of proof have
been somewhat abrogated. The jury may now rely on the testimony of expert
witnesses and need not decide the question on the basis of their own in-
dividual knowledge. Many courts and commentators have noted the advances
made in medical science.2 4 The majority in the Ladd case took judicial
notice of this and also the improvements made in scientific crime detection.25
21. Commonwealth v. Ladd, supra note 1, majority opinion at 8. Appellant also
raised the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.
22. COKE, 3 INST. 52 (1797).
23. THAYER, EVIDENCE 174 (1898).
24. People v. Legeri, 239 App. Div. 47, 48, 266 N.Y.S. 86, 88 (1933) ; SPECIAL
REPORT FROM THE SELECT 'COMMITTEE ON HOMICIDE LAW AMENDMENT BILL, ETC., MIN-
UTES OF EVIDENCE, ETC. 7, 68 (English 1874).
25. Commonwealth v. Ladd, supra note 1, majority opinion at 8.
[Vol. 65
RECENT CASES
Consequently, a period of a year and a day after which death is conclusively
presumed to result from natural causes is no longer realistic.
Though being inadequate in the light of modern medical advances the
rule did serve a need for some form of limitation to "cut-off" causation.
This need may be pointed up by a brief comparison of causation in civil
survival and wrongful death actions, and criminal felonious homicide cases.
In criminal cases there must usually be an unbroken chain of events
between the defendant's act and the decedent's death. To establish such a
chain, two factors must be satisfied. First, the defendant's act must be a
contributing cause leading to the death, and second, there must be no inde-
pendent intervening agencies. The sine qua non or "but for" test is applied
to assure that defendant's act was a contributing factor. If an agency has
intervened between the defendant's act and the death, the foreseeability
test from the benefit of hindsight is used to determine if there is an inde-
pendent intervening agency. If the agency was foreseeable, it would not
constitute an independent intervening agency so as to relieve the defendant
from responsibility.
26
In the civil wrongful death or survival actions resulting from an inten-
tional tort perpetrated by the defendant, the factors constituting causation
are much the same. However, in addition, there is an indirect limitation
on causation, that being, the statute of limitations for maintaining the wrong-
ful death 27 and survival actions, 28 which are one and two years respectively.
Thus, in civil actions, the statute of limitations has the effect of sever-
ing causation at a maximum of two years.29 There is no statute of limitations
on indictment for felonies homicide, nor would the adoption of one be prac-
tical. However, in the absence of some sort of limitation on the causal rela-
tionship, one might, as the result of a childhood fracas, conceivably be con-
victed many years later of some form of felonious homicide. The "year and
a day" rule served to negate such a result in murder and manslaughter.
Complete abolition of the rule clearly recognizes the advances in medical
technology, but also creates a need for some form of limitation on causation.
Should the legislature decide to act in this area there are at least two solu-
tions which seem to serve both requirements. First, the legislature might
possibly expand the time of limitation from a year and a day to a period
within which medical experts might reasonably determine that the death
flowed from the wrongful assault of the accused. For example, the period
26. Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949) ; Commonwealth
v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 113 A.2d 464 (1955).
27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 34 (1895).
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 1603 (1855).
29. In some cases of the continuing trespass type a cause of action may be main-
tained in excess of two years after the original wrongful act. However, the analogy
being drawn is to the assault cases where no continuing trespass is involved.
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of a "year and a day" might be extended to five or ten years, or to that point
in time wherein it becomes difficult for medical science to determine whether
the death flowed from the assault or from natural or other causes. This solu-
tion would, however, entail speculation in determining the point after which
causation based on medical technology becomes indefinite and unsure. In
addition, the "cut-off" point is arbitrary which was one of the major criti-
cisms of the "year and a day" rule expressed by the court in the Ladd case.
A second, and more realistic approach, which would better serve the
aims of society and protect the rights of the accused, would be for the legis-
lature to enact a statute establishing a period after which there would be a
rebuttable presumption that the accused did not cause the death of the
decedent. The result would be to place the adjudication of felonious homicide
causation solely within the province of the jury as a finding of fact. This
solution then, would have all the usual protections provided by jury trial,
and would also take into consideration medical advances without being
arbitrary in nature.30 In this manner the void, created by the instant case,
could be filled to better serve the ends of Justice, which prompted abolition
of the "year and a day" rule.
EDWIN L. KLETT
30. However, query whether the adoption of a rebuttable presumption that death,
after a certain period, resulted from natural causes would place an additional burden of
proof on the prosecution in light of the existing presumption of innocence. In theory,
it seems the state would face no greater obstacle. In practice, the legislative and judicial
recognition of such a rebuttable presumption would serve to accentuate to the trier-of-fact
that the defendant's act must have at least been a contributing cause of the decedent's
death. In this manner, a proper finding of causal relationship would tend to be insured
as the informed jury would be fully aware that after a long period death from natural
causes is the likely alternative.
